Three bits of bullpen news in the past few days combined to raise, again, the question: Are today’s top relief pitchers used in the most effective manner?

Those news items: Milwaukee pulled Eric Gagne from the closer’s role; St. Louis did the same with Jason Isringhausen (and later put him on the disabled list); and the Twins lost Pat Neshek for the season.

Neshek, unlike Gagne or Isringhausen, has never had the glory (or the paycheck) of the ninth-inning job. But he was arguably a more important member of the Twins bullpen than closer Joe Nathan.

Nathan almost never enters a game with men on base — last season, he inherited eight base runners, three of whom scored (a strand rate of 62.5 percent) Neshek was often called upon to douse an actual rally— he inherited 59 base runners last season, 14 of whom scored (strand rate 76.3 percent).

Consider Friday’s game. The at-bat in which the Rockies had their best shot at the Twins came in the eighth inning, when cleanup hitter Todd Helton came up with the tying run on base. Who faced Helton with the game on the line? Not the bullpen ace. It was Dennys Reyes — who got Helton to hit a weak nubber to the mound. The conventional wisdom for almost two decades — since Tony LaRussa made Dennis Eckersley a one-inning specialist in 1988 — has been to designate a closer and reserve him for ninth-inning save situations. Jams in earlier innings? They’re for somebody else to deal with.

This does keep relief aces healthier than in the days when 100-inning seasons were common and flameouts were the rule. But the current strategy isn’t necessarily more effective at winning games.

Tom Verducci of Sports Illustrated, writing last January about Goose Gossage’s election to the Hall of Fame, noted that major league teams in 2007 protected 86 percent of seventh-inning leads — a slightly lower percentage than in 1967 (87 percent), when the save was not an official statistic.

It is not a coincidence that the Detroit Tigers had 90-plus win seasons in 2006 and 2007 with their two most talented relief pitchers (Joel Zumaya and Fernando Rodney) working middle relief. Closer Todd Jones had the ninth inning — and no jams to work out of. This year Zumaya and Rodney are injured, and the Tigers are hurting. Ditto the Cleveland Indians last season, with closer Joe Borowski racking up 45 saves with an ERA of 5.07. The Tribe had more effective and talented arms — such as Rafael Betancourt and Rafael Perez — killing rallies and chewing up the seventh and eighth innings.

Teams without a designated closer — like the Brewers and Cardinals — are said to be using “bullpen by committee,” but what they’re really doing is trying to find a bullpen ace. The Tigers and Indians are the real “committee” teams, even if they won’t acknowledge that their best relievers aren’t fed the saves.

Ron Gardenhire is not a manager to challenge convention. He will deal with the loss of Neshek by assigning more of the heavy lifting to Jesse Crain, Juan Rincon and Matt Guerrier.

That can work — if Crain’s post-surgical arm can handle the strain, if Rincon reverts to his 2005-06 form, if Guerrier’s 2007 wasn’t a mirage.

But if Nathan is really worthy of the big contract he got in spring training, Gardenhire should get more inventive — use his best relief pitcher in the highest leverage situations.

Have Nathan come in with two on in the eighth to face Paul Konerko or Magglio Ordonez. Let Crain or Rincon pitch the ninth inning with three-run leads.

It’s not going to happen. But it would be more effective.