Denard Span is a “Moneyball” hitter. He takes balls, fouls off strikes, extends at-bats, gets on base — all the skills touted in the book about the Oakland A’s general manager, Billy Beane.

Odd, then, to look back at that book — still influential and controversial six years after its publication — and realize that Span was a prototype of the player Beane sought to avoid in the 2002 draft, a centerpiece of the book.

Span was a raw high schooler with tools, especially speed. Beane and Co. reckoned — at the time, correctly — that such players were overvalued.

Beane had, in addition, a major league team ready to win but not the payroll space to add veterans to it, so he wanted to draft players capable of getting to the majors fast, not in five-year development projects.

It’s been more than seven years since that draft, and it’s instructive to eyeball it today. It’s recent enough that most players taken that June are still in their 20s, and far enough in the past to declare some picks busts.

And because Beane, who was loaded with seven of the first 41 picks, was so aggressive about drafting players in whom the rest of baseball was largely disinterested, and because Michael Lewis’ book disseminated Beane’s thinking so widely, it’s a fair time to check how well his approach worked.

First, a broad overview: Of the first 41 picks — the first round and supplemental round — 17 have developed into regulars.

Some — Prince Fielder, the seventh overall pick; Zach Grienke, 6th ; Cole Hamels, 17th — are as good as it gets. Others — Jeremy Hermida, 11th, Jeremy Guthrie, 22nd, Mark Teahen, 39th — are marginal regulars. Still others — Jeff Francis, 9th; Khalil Greene, 13th — showed signs of stardom and then hit career crossroads.

But 17 have, for a least a couple of years each, become regulars in the majors. Call them the successful picks.

That leaves 23 others who didn’t, people like Bryan Bullington, the first player chosen, and Chris Gruler, the third player picked.

It’s a daunting thought for a scouting director. Millions of dollars were lavished on those 41 players, and less than 42 percent turned into contributing major leaguers in seven years. Few if any of the remaining 58 percent are going to make it.

John McCurdy, for example. The A’s used the 26th pick on him; he last played in the minors in 2006. Washed out.

How did the A’s fare in that draft? The traditionalists, stung by the tone of Lewis’ book, like to claim that the Moneyball draft of 2002 was a disaster for the A’s.

Not so. It wasn’t a smashing success, but it wasn’t a disaster either.

Oakland, as noted above, had seven picks in the top 41. Three of them — Nick Swisher, 16th; Joe Blanton, 24th; and Teahen — turned into major league regulars. The other four — McCurdy, Ben Fritz, Jeremy Brown and Stephen Obenchain — didn’t.